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We provide systematic evidence for the association of liquidity shocks and aggregate asset 
prices during mechanically identified asset price boom/bust episodes for 18 OECD countries 
since the 1970s, while taking care of the endogeneity of money and credit. Our derivation of 
liquidity shocks allows for frequent shifts in velocity as they are derived as structural shocks 
from VARs in growth rates. Residential property price developments and money growth 
shocks accumulated over the boom periods are able to well explain the depth of post-boom 
recessions. We further suggest that liquidity shocks are a driving factor for real estate prices 
during boom episodes. During normal times however, the relative predictive power of   
liquidity shocks seems to shift from asset price inflation to consumer price inflation. The 
results only hold for broad money growth based liquidity shocks and not for private credit 
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There is an ongoing discussion on whether central banks should at times of perceived rising 
financial imbalances consider tightening the monetary policy stance more than what is 
required to keep consumer price inflation on target over a short to medium term horizon 
(‘leaning against the wind’ policy). The reason would be the attempt to contain, or at least not 
accommodate, booming financial markets in order to reduce the costs, both in terms of 
inflation variability and real growth, resulting from a possible bust of asset prices. 
One important element of the discussion is in how far potentially harmful asset price 
boom/bust episodes are associated with cycles in money and credit aggregates. The ECB has 
been repeatedly arguing that if that association is real, its monetary analysis could implicitly 
(though not mechanistically) support such a ‘leaning against the wind’ policy. The monetary 
policy tightening triggered by strong money growth during asset price boom episodes might 
be the optimal reaction to maintain price stability in the medium to long run. With respect to 
the information content of money and credit, the interesting broad issues are a) whether there 
really is systematic evidence for association between growth in money and credit aggregates 
and (harmful) asset price boom/bust cycles, and b) whether strong money and credit growth 
might even be a cause for asset price booms and not just an endogenous reflection of the 
business cycle and asset price developments. 
 
We identify 42 aggregate asset price boom episodes for 18 OECD countries with quarterly 
data since the 1970s. We then compute the average behaviour over the boom-bust cycles for a 
host of macroeconomic variables. In particular, we focus on differences between benign (low-
cost in terms of post-boom real GDP growth) and serious (high-cost) boom episodes. These 
stylised facts suggest the importance of real estate prices and money and credit developments 
for the boom-bust derailment.  
 
We then cleanse broad money and private credit growth rates from endogenous developments 
due to business or asset price cycles by means of VAR technology. This allows us to confirm 
and elaborate on hypotheses suggested by the observed differences between high and low-
cost boom episodes by means of regression analyses. Money growth shocks during the boom 
and pre-boom periods contribute to explaining the depth of post-boom recessions even if one 
controls for housing price developments during the boom and in the post-boom phase, and for 
the monetary policy stance during the boom and in the post-boom phase (measured by 
deviations from a Taylor-rule). Real residential property price developments during the boom 
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Part of the information content of money to explain post-boom recessions does indeed come 
from the possibly causal effect of liquidity shocks on real residential housing prices during 
boom periods. This is shown by a panel analysis explaining housing price developments, 
where the different boom episodes constitute the cross-section dimension.  
 
While all these results hold for broad money growth, nearly no informational content is found 
for private credit growth.  
 
The panel analysis using the whole sample, i.e. all boom and non-boom periods available for 
each country, shows a much weaker relationship between liquidity shocks and asset price 
inflation than when focusing on asset price boom periods. Other more standard variables like 
income and interest rates gain in relative importance in normal times. Switching the 
endogenous variable from the change in real housing prices to consumer price inflation 
reveals the opposite pattern. Liquidity shocks seem to contribute to explaining consumer price 
inflation for the whole sample but not at all during boom episodes. 
 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, according to our knowledge, it is the first 
systematic evidence across countries and time periods establishing a robust positive 
association between money and aggregate asset price booms while taking care of endogeneity 
issues. Our sample has a broad country coverage and the methodology is designed for 
focusing on asset price boom episodes. Second, by using liquidity shocks allowing for 
frequent permanent shifts in velocity and cumulating these liquidity shocks over a fixed 
horizon to capture the concept of slowly building imbalances, we combine two recently 
advocated concepts to detect information content in money. Macroeconomic data series 
associated with asset price boom/bust episodes are likely to exhibit volatile, non-standard and 
non-linear behaviour. By using different empirical methods, among which robust and quantile 
regressions for the cross-section analysis, and different estimation techniques for the panel 
analysis increases confidence in the results. In our view, the current results are important 
enough to trigger further research to investigate the potential role of money as an early 
warning indicator for eventually deflationary boom/bust episodes.  
 
Nevertheless, the provided evidence on causality running from liquidity shocks to asset prices 
has to be taken with a grain of salt, first of all, due to the small sample of boom/bust episodes 
but also due to the fact that no econometric identification scheme can claim to perfectly 
resolve the endogeneity problem. The case for association between money and asset prices 
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1.  Introduction 
The motivation for this paper stems from the ongoing discussion on whether central banks 
should at times of perceived rising financial imbalances consider tightening the monetary 
policy stance more than what is required to keep consumer price inflation on target over a 
short to medium term horizon. The reason would be the attempt to contain, or at least not 
accommodate, booming financial markets in order to reduce the costs, both in terms of 
inflation variability and real growth, resulting from a possible bust of financial market 
exuberance. In its 2006 Annual Report, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) warns 
against risks for the world economy should recent booming asset price developments at the 
global level, possibly triggered by too loose monetary policy stances, as measured by 
exceptionally low interest rates and strongly growing credit and money stocks, be swiftly 
reversed. This way of thinking about asset prices and monetary policy has been influenced by 
several studies at the (BIS), see e.g. Borio and Lowe (2002), Borio, English and Filardo 
(2003) or White (2006) as well as Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000). These 
studies clearly advocate some kind of the above described policy, which is also known as 
“leaning against the wind”, “extra action”
4 or “pro-active policy”
5 with respect to booming 
asset prices
6. This policy recommendation clearly deviates from the orthodox central banker’s 
view  or the “conventional policy framework”
7 that asset prices should influence monetary 
policy only indirectly in as far as they affect the outlook for inflation through effects on 
aggregate demand via a wealth (consumers) or balance sheet (firms) channel. A more critical 
view on the “extra action” policy has been provided by Bordo and Jeanne (2002) and Gruen, 
Plumb and Stone (2005). These authors derive “leaning against the wind” as the optimal 
policy in theory but then show that the informational requirements to successfully conduct 
such policy are very heavy
8.  
Careful discussions of the pros and cons of reacting to asset prices from a central banker’s 
point of view are to be found in Issing (2003), Trichet (2005) and Papademos (2006). For a 
more sceptical view see Kohn (2006).  
One important element of the discussion is in how far potentially harmful asset price 
boom/bust episodes are associated with cycles in money and credit aggregates. The ECB has 
been repeatedly arguing that if that association is real, its monetary analysis could implicitly 
(though not mechanistically) shadow a leaning against the wind policy as recommended by 
                                                 
4 See Kohn (2006) arguing against  “extra action” and in favour of  the “conventional strategy”. 
5 Bordo and Jeanne (2002).  
6 A more extreme view is to directly include asset prices in the price index used by the central bank to 
achieve its objective of price stability, see Alchian and Klein (1973). This view has received much 
criticism, see e.g. ECB (2005). Goodhart (2001) argues instead for an inclusion of only housing prices 
rather than equity prices. 
7 See White (2006). 
8 For a more detailed survey of this literature see Detken and Smets (2004). 
9 Issing (2002) first mentioned this aspect of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. See also ECB (2005). 
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money growth during asset price boom episodes might be exactly the “extra action” required 
to maintain price stability in the medium to long run. With respect to the information content 
of money and credit, the interesting broad issues are a) whether there really is systematic 
evidence for association between growth in money and credit aggregates and (harmful) asset 
price boom/bust cycles, b) whether liquidity shocks might even be a cause for asset price 
booms and not just an endogenous reflection of the business cycle and asset price 
developments and c) whether monitoring money and credit aggregates in real time provides 
information on the nature of the asset price boom, which could be used for monetary policy 
purposes. 
 
The rest of the paper will address issues a) and b) while leaving c) for a more systematic 
evaluation of future research. The paper is structured as follows. While this paper is a purely 
empirical exercise, Section 2 will nevertheless provide a brief overview of some theoretical 
approaches which could explain the link between money, credit and asset price booms. 
Section 3 provides some descriptive statistics of what are the most distinctive macroeconomic 
features of asset price boom/bust cycles, refining the approach used in Detken and Smets 
(2004), by e.g. using quarterly instead of annual data for the sample of 18 OECD countries 
since the 1970s
10. Despite the improved methodology and extended data set, this section 
mainly confirms previous findings. For example we show again a strong association between 
money growth and those aggregate asset price booms, which lead to more costly recessions in 
the bust phase. This exposition of stylised facts drawing explicitly on correlations, raises the 
issue of causality and leads to the formulation of several hypothesis, which are then explored 
below. Section 4 derives structural money and credit growth shocks of 18 country VARs. 
Section 5 performs a cross-section bust analysis. We use 41 boom episodes as cross-sections 
and see whether liquidity shocks during the boom episodes can explain the size of the post-
boom recessions. We conclude that liquidity shocks, if derived with reference to broad 
money, contribute to explaining post-boom recessions. Section 6 conducts a panel boom 
analysis. The cross-section elements are again the identified boom episodes, while the period 
starting four quarters prior to the boom until the final quarter of the boom constitute the time 
dimension. We investigate whether liquidity shocks contributes to explain real residential 
property price developments during the boom episodes and find that it is actually the most 
robust explanatory factor. Comparing these panel boom estimates with panel estimates where 
the cross-section dimension is countries and the time series dimension is the whole sample 
from 1972 until 2004, shows that here liquidity shocks are only one among several 
explanatory variables and economically less important. This strengthens the argument that 
                                                 
10 We use the BIS data on aggregate asset prices appropriately weighting equity, residential and 
commercial property prices for 18 OECD countries. See the data annex for more details. 
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several of the above mentioned authors
9. The monetary policy tightening triggered by strong  
some particular information value is inherent in money during asset price boom episodes. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, according to our knowledge, it is the first 
systematic evidence across countries and time periods establishing a robust positive 
association between money and aggregate asset price booms while taking care of the 
endogeneity of money. The paper’s objective is similar to Gouteron and Szpiro (2005). By 
finding a significant link between liquidity and asset prices, we reach opposite conclusions 
than they did most likely because our country sample is broader and our  methodology is 
designed for focusing on asset price boom episodes. Furthermore, analysing real estate prices 
instead of equity prices could explain the differences in results compared to previous papers
11. 
Second, by deriving money growth and credit growth shocks allowing for frequent permanent 
shifts in velocity
12 and cumulating lagged measures of these shocks to capture the concept of 
building imbalances
13, we combine two recently advocated concepts to detect information 
content in money and credit. By using different empirical methods, among which robust and 
quantile regressions for the cross-section analysis, and different estimation techniques for the 
panel analysis increase confidence in the results. In our view, the current results are important 
enough to trigger further research to investigate the potential role of money as an early 
warning indicator for eventually deflationary boom/bust episodes.  
Nevertheless, the provided evidence on causality running from liquidity shocks to asset prices 
has to be taken with a grain of salt, first of all due to the small sample of boom/bust episodes 
but also due to the fact that no VAR identification scheme and no instrumental variable 
approach can claim to perfectly resolve the endogeneity issue. Therefore, the case for 




2.  Theoretical approaches linking liquidity and asset prices 
 
The purpose of this section is to briefly survey what are the available theoretical approaches  
explaining a positive link between liquidity and asset prices in general and asset price bubbles 
in particular.  
The most prominent theory of a link between monetary policy and asset prices is of course 
monetarism. A monetary policy shock will affect the quantity and marginal utility of money 
relative to other assets (as well as to consumption and production). The money holding sector 
will restore equilibrium by changing several relative prices not only but also in asset 
                                                 
11 See e.g. Machado and Sousa (2005). 
12 See Reynard (2006). 
13 See Borio and Lowe (2002). 
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portfolios
14. Monetarists have interpreted real money balances capturing the many channels of 
monetary transmission via a host of asset returns. Money has been attributed the role of an 
index for the whole spectrum of interest rates measuring substitution rather than wealth 
effects. In particular money might proxy for physical asset returns like property, which are 
also more difficult to measure. For a review of these kind of arguments the reader should 
consult Nelson (2003, pp. 1048).  
With regard to other financial institutions, increases in the supply of money are thought to 
trigger a rebalancing of the liquidity/asset ratio compatible with optimal portfolio allocation 
of each institution, which leads to a higher demand for assets and thus asset price increases. 
Congdon (2005) stresses the importance of broad money instead of the traditional monetarist 
focus on narrow money and argues that it is exactly the behaviour of (non-bank) financial 
institutions that matters for the determination of asset prices. Thus, it would not necessarily be 
a money supply shock narrowly defined which is driving asset prices but rather strong broad 
money growth as a reflection of financial institutions portfolio choices
15. In a similar vein 
Adrian and Shin (2006) argue that the empirically observed ‘leverage targeting’ behaviour of 
banks can create a mutually reinforcing, positive association between money and asset prices. 
Rising asset prices will trigger a rise in bank indebtedness, which might easily show up in   
marketable instruments included in the definition of broad money. The additional funds 
available to banks might then spur additional demand for assets.  
 
Another important aspect stressed by monetarist literature is the property of monetary 
aggregates to be a summary statistics of the degree of uncertainty about future developments 
of asset prices and the nature of monetary or other kinds of shocks, e.g. with respect to the 
persistence of these shocks
16. A large liquidity share held by financial institutions could be a 
sign of uncertainty of future asset price developments. Such fluctuations in broad money 
demand would at some point be corrected by the described increase in asset demand, possibly 
foremost in more durable assets like housing, rather than bonds
17, as real estate is a better 
hedge in times of fears of future inflation. This rebalancing of financial portfolios
18 with lots 
of liquidity waiting to be invested in less liquid assets could potentially reinforce emerging 
trends in asset prices. 
                                                 
14 Meltzer (1995). The portfolio idea is also found in Friedman (1988), although there he attempts to 
explain money demand by using stock prices as additional explanatory variables, while here the focus 
is on the reverse causality.  
15 Congdon (2005, p. 17) acknowledges that his analysis seems more Keynesian than monetarist in 
spirit. He writes that “…in effect, the whole paper is an analysis of the empirical significance of the 
speculative demand for money.” 
16 See Brunner and Meltzer (1971).  
17 Meltzer (1995) explicitly mentions the effect of liquidity on land and housing prices as being of 
particular importance for the US and Japan in the 80s and 90s. 
18 This of course would not lead to more equity or housing assets and less money circulating in the 
economy, but simply to relative price adjustments.  
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Some of the other traditional monetary transmission mechanisms, like the bank lending 
channel or the balance-sheet channel, basically reinforce the above effects by establishing a 
link between credit and asset prices. Here asymmetric information and costly enforcement of 
contracts create agency problems in financial markets
19. Under quite restrictive assumptions, 
the bank lending channel links bank deposits (as determined by monetary policy) to bank 
loans
20. Recently, Diamond and Rajan (2006) have introduced the “liquidity version” of the 
bank lending channel relaxing some of the restrictive assumptions. The authors instead 
assume a significant degree of impatience of investors in order to provide a role for liquidity. 
In the balance-sheet channel lending and thus investment is increasing when looser monetary 
policy reduces the adverse selection and moral hazard problem so that the external finance 
premium is lowered
21. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) stress that the balance-sheet channel 
could not only apply to firms but equally to consumers and affect their housing purchases. 
Mishkin (1978) describes the “liquidity-effects view” of the balance-sheet channel and   
argues that the impact of monetary policy on lending rests not only on the lenders desire to 
lend but the consumers desire to borrow. The latter depends on the likelihood consumers 
attribute to the possibility of finding themselves in financial distress, which in turn affects 
their relative demand for liquid and for durable assets such as housing.    
 
More recently Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003) have introduced money besides several 
financial frictions in a medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. This 
model can be used to show that broad monetary aggregates are useful in providing the central 
bank with information on the type and persistence of shocks hitting the economy. The reason 
is that due to a cash-in-advance constraint, broad money growth reflects the expected path of 
future consumption. Thus if  agents are better able than the central bank to extract information 
on the nature of shocks affecting consumption and asset prices, broad money will be 
positively correlated with asset prices, e.g. in times of permanent productivity shocks.  In 
another paper Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006) show how a stock market boom/bust 
cycle would be positively associated with (narrow) money and credit cycles. A central bank 
which takes into account liquidity developments conducts in this model a welfare enhancing 
monetary policy.        
 
There exist several theories explaining how loose monetary policy could actually trigger asset 
price bubbles, which would reinforce the above mentioned mechanisms. Some of these 
approaches are briefly described below. 
 
                                                 
19 See Mishkin (1995). 
20 See Kashyap and Stein (1997). 
21 See Bernanke and Gertler (1989). 
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First of all, authors of the Austrian school have argued (see exposition in White (2006)) that if 
the market lending rate is below the natural rate of interest, defined as the real rate which 
maintains price stability in the long run, previously marginal investment projects will be 
financed and credit will expand
22. This leads to an investment and asset price boom. At some 
point these marginal projects turn out to be unproductive. Overcapacities will lead to a severe 
and possibly long lasting recession and an asset price bust.  
 
Allen and Gale (2000a) develop a model where investors borrow to invest in assets in fixed 
supply (an assumption particularly relevant for housing or even equity in the medium run). 
Risk shifting, due to the non-convexity of the investors’ pay-off structure combined with the 
inability to observe the risk of actual investments, allows for assets being priced above their 
fundamental value. The authors show that credit expansion and the expectation of future 
credit expansion critically affects today’s asset price. Uncertainty about the future course of 
monetary policy and credit might be particularly high during periods of financial 
liberalisation
23. Illing (2000) provides a variation of the Allen and Gale (2000b) model where 
an asset price bubble is triggered by an asymmetric reaction function of the central bank. If 
the central bank would supply liquidity in a crisis, but is expected to be hesitant to withdraw it 
after a crisis is avoided, a bubble can occur even without agency problem, uncertainty about 
future credit, or irrational exuberance on the side of investors.    
 
Herring and Wachter (2003) analyse the reasons for bubbles in the real estate market and 
stress some behavioural characteristics of bank management as being important to create a 
mutual relationship between real estate prices and bank credit. Higher asset prices increase 
the value of banks’ own assets and the value of potential collateral. Together with disaster 
myopia and the perverse incentives of bank managers, this can trigger real estate bubbles. 
Disaster myopia is the tendency over time to underestimate the probability of low-frequency 
shocks
24.  Perverse incentives can prevail as even prudent lenders might be forced to accept 
weaker borrowing standards or have to withdraw from the market, once competition from 
disaster myopic banks becomes tougher, which is often the case during a boom. Furthermore, 
Herring and Wachter also stress the risk-shifting incentives for bank managers. The types of 
behaviours mentioned by the authors are more likely to become relevant in times of rising real 
estate prices, which in turn are more likely in an environment with falling and low interest 
rates.  
                                                 
22 Borio, English and Filardo (2003) argue that a combination of reduced pricing power of firms due to 
globalisation, positive productivity shocks and well anchored inflation expectations, mislead central 
banks to maintain interest rates too low for too long and thus help trigger asset price overvaluations.  
23 In a more realistic setting, restrictions on short sales of the asset would be required for the results to 
hold, see Allen and Gale (2000a, p. 252). Again this is a feature applying to real estate (see Herring and 
Wachter (2003).  
24 Guttentag and Herring (1984). 
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In a similar vein Rajan (2005 and 2006) conjectures that low interest rates and ample liquidity 
supply could reinforce certain characteristics of fund managers’ behaviour which are 
conducive to asset price bubbles and financial instability. Among the characteristics 
mentioned by Rajan are, again, risk-shifting due to the incentive structures provided by fund 
managers’ contracts, tail-risk seeking including attempts to hide tail-risk from fund investors, 
herding and illiquidity seeking. In times of ample liquidity supplied by the central bank, it 
becomes more difficult for investment managers to earn excess returns by providing liquidity 
to markets of otherwise illiquid assets. Their investments will then concentrate in less and less 
liquid and possibly more risky assets.  Rajan concludes that such a behavioural transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy could work entirely through institutions outside the banking 
system and be poorly captured when only looking at credit developments.  
  
Recently Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2006) show that introducing learning in a standard 
consumption based asset pricing model can produce excess volatility and low frequency 
deviations from rational expectations asset prices. Moreover, in this model, expansionary 
monetary policy, i.e. low interest rates are associated with increased asset price volatility as 
long as agents are sufficiently risk averse. 
 
Some of the above arguments would support the finding that the booming asset prices are 
more likely to be durable assets such as real estate rather than equity or bonds
25.   
 
Could all or some of those theoretical channels be equally valid across countries and across 
different financial regimes? Meltzer (1995) mentions that the monetarist channel does not 
depend on the degree of financial market sophistication or the availability of financial 
instruments of a country at any particular point in time. This would be an important aspect in 
light of the following empirical analysis, as we attempt to find common patterns across a 
variety of boom episodes across countries and time periods and are thus implicitly dealing 
with a variety of financial system structures. Eventually though, correlations between asset 
prices and liquidity measures are not always independent of the prevailing financial system. 
One example is the observation that for the euro area since about 1998 non-monetary 
financial intermediaries (investment funds, pension funds, insurance corporations etc.) 
contribution to annual M3 growth is becoming significant (recently contributing as much as 2 
percentage points from the roughly 8 percentage points M3 growth in the euro area). This is 
                                                 
25 Helbling and Terrones (2003) though show that equity price booms are more frequent than real estate 
price booms. However, the economic consequences of a bust in real estate prices are more severe than 
busts in stock price booms. Bordo and Jeanne (2002) also  find that although there are overall more 
equity booms than real estate booms, there are relatively more real estate price booms, which are 
followed by a bust phase (52.5% for property versus 12.5% of equity booms). On the importance of 
housing price booms see also Calverly (2004) and Cecchetti (2006). 
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most likely due to the fact that non-monetary financial intermediaries can use financial 
derivatives such as swaps or future contracts to take positions in a particular asset, while the 
underlying assets are deposits, which are included in M3
26. This could be one reason for an 
association between asset prices and broad money, which of course could not have played an 
important role in earlier asset price boom episodes, due to the unavailability of financial 
instruments and the lack of sophisticated risk management capabilities. This observation 
should be taken as a caveat for the following analysis in the sense that the reported significant 
cross-section and panel results do eventually not alleviate the burden to further analyse the 
reason for these findings on a country by country basis, taking into account the specifics of 




3.  Some stylised facts about asset price boom/bust episodes 
 
In order to investigate the association between money and credit developments and asset price 
booms, we systematically identify boom episodes using the real aggregate asset price indices 
provided by the BIS for 18 OECD countries between 1970 Q1 and 2004 Q4. The asset price 
indices combine consumer price deflated residential property prices, commercial property 
prices and equity prices according to the (infrequently updated) actual weights in each 
economy
27. Our method to identify boom periods is a refined version of the one suggested in 
Detken and Smets (2004), since here we use quarterly instead of annual data. An asset price 
boom is defined as the consecutive periods (minimum 4 quarters) in which the real aggregate 
asset price index exceeds its trend by at least 10%. The trend is estimated using a very slow 
adjusting HP-Filter (λ=100000), which is estimated recursively, i.e. taking into account only  
data available at the time
28.  We then classify the 42 identified boom episodes, which are of 
variable length, into high and low-cost booms, depending on the average real GDP growth in 
the three years following the boom compared to the average growth during the boom
29.  
                                                 
26 See ECB (2006). 
27 See Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994). 
28 See Borio and Lowe (2002). For example, the trend of the aggregate asset price index in Japan in 
1986 Q2 has been estimated using only information up to exactly 1986 Q2. The percentage 
difference to the actual index has been 11.5%, which exceeds 10%. Successively adding one 
observation and computing the trend and the gap until the gap falls bellow the 10% threshold, 
resulted in the 16 quarter boom (up to 1990 Q1), which is listed in Table 1. There certainly exist 
alternative methodologies to identify boom periods. A similarly mechanic one would be to use the 
Bry and Boschan (1971) algorithm to detect local peaks and throughs, as used for business cycle 
dating. Bordo and Jeanne (2002) use moving averages of growth rates and compare to the historical 
trend. Alternatively and much more challengingly, one could try to approximate the fundamental 
value of asset prices in each period and compute the gap to current prices. See also Machedo and 
Sousa (2006).  
29 Some additional conditions are used for boom identification and classification to avoid 
unreasonable results. Fist of all, if there are less than four quarters between two boom periods, we 
14
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In this way we identify 20 high cost booms (annualised change at least -2.4 p.p.) and 22 low-
cost booms (annualised drop smaller than 2.4 p.p.).  Table 1 shows the identified boom 
periods for each country. 
 
1988Q3-1990Q1  (7) Australia 1979Q4-1981Q4  (9)
Belgium 1988Q2-1990Q3  (10)
1988Q1-1990Q1  (9) Canada
1988Q2-1990Q1  (8) Switzerland 1999Q1-2001Q1  (9)
1989Q3-1990Q3  (5) 1999Q3-2000Q3  (5) Germany
1983Q4-1986Q4  (13) Denmark 1997Q1-2001Q3  (19)
1986Q2-1991Q2  (21) Spain 1998Q1-2001Q2  (14)
1980Q1-1989Q3  (39) 1997Q1-2000Q3  (15) Finland
1988Q4-1990Q3  (8) France 1999Q1-2001Q2  (10)
1972Q3-1973Q4  (6) 1985Q4-1990Q1  (18) United Kingdom 1999Q1-2000Q4  (8)
1987Q1-1990Q3  (13) Ireland 1977Q4-1979Q3  (8)
Italy 1980Q4-1981Q3  (4) 1999Q1-2001Q2  (10)
1973Q1-1973Q4  (4) 1986Q2-1990Q1  (16) Japan
1988Q3-1990Q3  (9) 1993Q4-2000Q4  (29) Netherlands 1976Q3-1978Q2  (8)
Norway 1973Q2-1974Q2  (5) 1996Q4-2001Q2  (19)
1983Q3-1984Q2  (4) 1986Q2-1987Q3  (6) New Zealand 1994Q3-1996Q4  (10)
1986Q3-1990Q2  (16) Sweden 1996Q2-2000Q3  (18)
United States 1986Q1-1987Q3  (7)
Number of  high-cost booms 20 Number of  low-cost booms 22
Total number of quarters 253 Total number of quarters 262
Average number of quarters 12.7 Average number of quarters 11.9
Median number of quarters 9 Median number of quarters 10
*Figures in parentheses refer to the number of quarters of the particular boom.
**For Australia 2004Q4 was identified as a boom quarter.
Table 1: Aggregate asset price booms in selected industrial countries (1970-2004)










In 16 out of our 20 identified high-cost booms, real GDP growth is actually declining in at 
least one of the three post boom years. This is only the case for 6 out of the 21 available low-
cost booms. The average real GDP growth during the post-boom period is 0.8% for high-cost 
and 1.8% for low-cost booms. Thus not all boom/bust cycles have really detrimental 
consequences.  
In a first step we use the identified boom episodes to compare the behaviour of a large 
number of macroeconomic variables for high-cost and low-cost booms for time periods 
defined relative to the beginning or the ending of the boom. The time periods depicted in the 
following graphs and Table A1 refer to the periods immediately before the boom (one and 
two years before the boom, i.e. “Pre1” and “Pre 2”, respectively), during the boom (first 
boom year, “B1”, the year prior to the asset price peak, “Peak” and the last boom year, 
“Last”) and immediately after the boom (one year, “Post1”, and two years, “Post2”, after the 
end of the boom)
30. For each of these periods we compute the annual growth rates or the 
deviations from their recursive HP-trend for the depicted variables (the latter we call a “gap”). 
The charts show for each period and variable the median of the respective group of high or 
                                                                                                                                            
bridge this period and identify one common boom. In case a cumulated drop in real aggregate asset 
prices during the boom exceeds 8%, the boom episode is terminated. If the average real GDP growth 
in the three post-boom years is larger than 2.5%, the boom cannot be classified as high-cost 
(independent of the size of the relative growth reduction). The 1986-1990 boom in Japan, although 
not reflected in our relative growth condition, was eventually followed by a period of prolonged low 
growth (“the lost decade”), which is why we classify it as high-cost.       
30 The Peak-Pre2 column in Table A1 refers to the cumulated change between these two periods. 
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low-cost booms
31. In order to test whether the differences in the medians are actually 
significant, we report the outcome of the rank based Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test
32. The size 
of the columns visualises the degree of significance for rejecting the null of no differences in 
populations (medians, ceteris paribus) between high and low-cost booms.  
With regard to the aggregate asset prices and their available subcomponents, residential 
property and share prices, it is important to observe that there is fairly no difference between 
high and low-cost booms for the aggregate asset price gap as depicted in Chart 1 (although 
aggregate asset prices fall significantly more for high cost boom episodes in the first post 
boom year, see Table A1). For high-cost booms we though find a significantly more negative 
real residential property price gap (Chart 2) and, correspondingly, a larger drop in real 
residential property prices in the two post-boom years (Table A1). The development of real 
housing prices during the bust is the main distinguishing feature of high and low-cost 
aggregate asset price booms (the gap and the growth rates provide the same highly significant 
and consistent message, see Table A1)
33. 
 
There also seems to be a stronger increase in the real estate price gap in the peak year and the 
last year of aggregate asset price booms, but these differences are not significant. When 
comparing real money and real private credit growth (Charts 3 and 4), the message is that 
money growth is significantly higher during high-cost boom episodes in the pre-boom phase 
and during the boom, while private credit is not. For the bust phase the difference in money 
growth is not so large although statistically significant, while private credit growth definitely 
collapses compared to low-cost boom episodes in both post-boom years. Chart 5 demonstrates 
mainly that our boom identification scheme works as intended and differences in growth 
performances between high and low-cost booms are significant (except for Pre1 and Post2). 
Chart 5 also warns that the issue of endogeneity with respect to the business cycle of money 
and credit variables during boom episodes is likely to be relevant. Charts 7 and 8 show real 
growth in total investment and housing investment, respectively. Interestingly, total 
investment growth is higher in low-cost boom episodes and significantly so for the second 
year before the boom and the first boom year, while housing investment is to the contrary 
larger during high-cost booms and significantly so during the peak year. This, again, stresses 
the major importance of housing price boom-bust cycles for the real economy.  
                                                 
31 Bordo and Jeanne (2002) provide similar charts reporting the mean of inflation, the output gap and 
private credit. They average over 19 property price and 24 equity price booms for OECD countries 
between 1970 and 2001. They do not distinguish between high and low-cost booms and do not 
perform tests of differences between equity and real estate booms. 
32  The four column sizes (from the tallest to the smallest) refer to the significance of differences in 
populations at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 20% significance levels, respectively. The test is non-parametric 
thus does not rely on any particular distributional assumptions. 
33 Cecchetti (2006) presents similar findings. His evidence shows that housing booms, contrary to 
equity booms, reduce expected growth prospects and increase the risk of very bad growth outcomes. 
Equity booms only deteriorate the worst outcomes. 
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Chart 6 depicts the respective medians for Taylor-rule gaps, i.e. the deviations of the short-
term interest rate from the recommendation of a standard Taylor-rule
34. Importantly, there has  
been a strong relaxation of monetary policy over the high-cost boom episodes, which is 
significantly different from the typical low-cost development
35. 
This loosening is only found with respect to the Taylor-rule. Nominal short interest rate gaps 
are actually rising during the high and low-cost booms (see Table A1), but apparently not 
sufficiently once business cycle dynamics are taken into account. Given the many problems 
associated with the computation of Taylor-rules in general and this calibrated version in 
particular, the evidence provided by Chart 6 is only suggestive. Chart 6 nevertheless fuels the 
                                                 
34  We use an outcome based, real-time Taylor rule, where the equilibrium values are computed with 
the recursive trends. The coefficients on the output and inflation gaps are set at 0.5 each for all 
countries (see Annex for more details). For each period we depict the average gap over four quarters.  
35 Usually evidence on the monetary policy stance during boom episodes is more of the event type of 
analysis. See e.g. Jonung et al. (2005) who confirm that the Finish and Swedish boom/bust cycles in the 
late 80s and early 90s were considerably worsened by procyclical monetary policies. 
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suspicion that the differences between high and low-cost booms might be related to the 
evolvement of the stance of monetary policy. 
Table A1 reveals some more interesting stylised facts of aggregate asset price boom-bust 
episodes. For example, the private credit gap seems to be particularly low in the two pre-
boom years for low-cost boom episodes. The inflation gap is significantly lower during the 
two pre-boom years and significantly higher for the last year of the boom and the first post-
boom year for high-cost boom episodes. 
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The spread between long and short term interest rates is significantly lower during all 
considered periods (except Pre1) for high-cost booms. The latter might be related to the 
existence of excessive liquidity and few attractive investment opportunities (see Rajan (2006) 
as mentioned above). Government net lending as ratio to GDP does not seem to play a 
decisive role in the distinction between high and low-cost booms
36.    
The above stylised facts do not allow interpretation in terms of causality. For example, money 
growth or credit growth could trigger the residential property price boom or be simply a 
                                                 
36 On fiscal policy during boom and bust episodes see Jaeger and Schuhknecht (2004). 
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reflection of endogenous responses of loans and mortgages triggered by an (exogenous) asset 
price boom and/or the related business cycle.  
 
The Charts 1-8 and the associated tests for significant differences between high and low-cost 
boom episodes lead to some hypothesis and questions, which we found worthwhile 
investigating in the rest of the paper by means of more formal regression analysis.  
Real residential property price developments seem to be key to explain post-boom recessions. 
It might be that already the size of the housing price boom has information content for the 
following reduction in real growth during the bust phase. Real broad money growth seems to 
be the better indicator than real private credit growth to determine whether the current asset 
price boom will be followed by a period of low real growth. The endogeneity of broad money 
and private credit growth with respect to both the business and the asset price cycles is a 
serious concern for the kind of analysis attempted here. It is not clear whether the focus on 
money and credit growth would add information value compared to simply evaluating the 
stance of monetary policy, as measured by a Taylor-type interest rate rule.  
If the association of money and/or credit and the asset price cycles will be robust to 
corrections for the endogeneity of the former, the issue would be whether there is evidence 
for a causal interpretation. As the causality is likely to work via the effect of liquidity shocks 
on asset and in particular on housing prices such a relationship would need to be shown for 
the boom episodes. Furthermore, we will analyse whether there is anything special to asset 





4.  VAR based liquidity shocks 
 
Excess liquidity is generally defined as an excess of money or credit, which is not in line with 
price stability in the long run
37. The few measures, which are commonly employed, are all 
based on the quantity equation of money. These excess liquidity measures are the price gap or 
real money gap, the nominal money gap, the monetary overhang, the money or credit to GDP 
ratio or the latter two deviations from their trend values
38. The basic difference between these 
measures is the way the equilibrium stock of money is determined and how past price and 
output changes are allowed to affect today’s equilibrium money stock. They have in common 
the basic monetarist notion of a stable money demand, and long run neutrality of money 
                                                 
37 Gouteron and Szpiro (2005, p. 4) 
38 See Gouteron and Szpiro (2005) and Polleit and Gerdesmeier (2005) for a detailed description of 
measures of excess liquidity. 
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implying that the excess liquidity will be absorbed by a rise in the price level, usually 
interpreted as the consumer price level. Our approach is closest related to the concept of 
monetary overhang, although with an important difference. We allow for permanent shifts in 
velocity very much in the spirit of Reynard (2006) as further explained below. We define 
liquidity shocks as unusually high money or credit growth with reference to the prevailing 
economic situation based on a broad set of variables. We do not take a stance whether 
liquidity growth is unusually high because of the monetary authority’s ample supply of 
liquidity or the money holding sector’s exceptionally strong money demand or simply 
because the economic environment has been changing swiftly so that agents did not yet adjust 
their portfolios. Our measure is a broad indicator of disequilibrium in the money market, in 
this respect comparable to the monetary overhang. Our sole purpose of deriving liquidity 
shocks is to solve or at least alleviate the endogeneity problem of broad money growth to test 
whether liquidity might affect real estate prices. In order to achieve this we run for each of 
our 18 countries the following VAR.  
 
(1)
t q t q t t t q t q t t t u X C X C X C X C Z B Z B Z B B Z + + + + + + + + + + = − − − − − − ... ... 2 2 1 1 0 2 2 1 1 0
 
where Z is a k-dimensional vector of endogenous variables, B0 a k-dimensional vector of 
constants and B1 -Bq  are  k x k – dimensional autoregressive coefficient matrices. Xt – Xt-q in 
our case represent k-dimensional vectors of the exogenous variable, C0-Cq are k-dimensional 
coefficients vectors. ut  is a k-dimensional vector of normally distributed, serially uncorrelated 
error terms with constant variance. The vector Z contains the following variables. 
 
money:     Z = (πcpi, yr, ∆is, nrp, equ, m, rex)’     
credit:     Z = (πcpi, yr, ∆is, nrp, equ, pc, rex)’     
 
both  with       X = com 
 
The vector Z comprises consumer price inflation (πcpi), real GDP growth (yr,), the first 
difference in the short term nominal interest rate (∆i), the growth rate of nominal private 
residential property prices (nrp) as well as the rate of change of nominal equity prices (equ), 
nominal money growth (m) or alternatively nominal private credit growth (pc), and the rate of 
change of the real effective exchange rate (rex), in this order. As exogenous variables, we 
always add the contemporaneous as well as lagged rate of change of commodity prices in US 
dollars (com)
39. The lags of the VAR are automatically determined by the Hannan-Quin 
criteria, which typically resulted in lags of order 1 or 2.  
                                                 
39 Only for the US do we include commodity prices among the variables in the VAR but order it first. 
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The VARs are then used to derive structural money and credit growth shocks. We do not label 
the money shock a monetary policy shock as we use broad money, i.e. M3, which by 
definition is strongly influenced by portfolio shifts between liquid and less liquid assets and 
because we do not have any theoretical prior to what might be the origin of incommensurate 
liquidity. The structural shocks are obtained by Cholesky decomposition. We order money or 
credit second to last - just before the real effective exchange rate. The farther behind a 
variable is ordered, the more endogenous the variable is in this system, as it also depends 
contemporaneously on all the previously ordered variables. This means that the common 
contemporaneous shocks to money or credit and to all other variables (except for the 
exchange rate) are attributed to shocks to these other variables and not to money or credit 
growth. Our intention is to be conservative with respect to solving the endogeneity problem of 
money and credit growth. The liquidity shock is thus unusual money or credit growth after 
lagged and contemporaneous business cycle, interest rate and asset price developments have 
been taken into account. We do not intend any other structural interpretation of the derived 
liquidity measures. The exchange rate is ordered last, as we do want to allow for the 
possibility of capital inflows, which are most likely associated with an appreciating exchange 
rate, to be recorded as a liquidity and not as an exchange rate shock
40. 
 
Most of the literature estimates these type of VARs in levels rather than differences. Recently 
Marcet (2005) has shown that the common fear of over-differencing in VARs (when variables 
in levels are already stationary) is unjustified
41. A VAR to any stationary process provides the 
correct moving average representation. Marcet argues that a VAR in differences might even 
be the more robust alternative than testing for unit roots and eventually estimating Vector 
Error Correction models. The more important issue about estimating in growth rates is not the 
econometric specification but rather the economic interpretation of our shocks. Contrary to 
the monetary overhang, which would resemble monetary shocks derived from a VAR in 
levels
42, using money growth rate shocks implicitly assumes an extreme bygones are bygones 
position. The previous quarter’s money demand/supply disequilibrium plays no role in this 
quarter’s derivation of the liquidity shock. One thus implicitly assumes that money demand is 
subject to permanent level shifts on a quarterly basis. This is an extreme assumption and we 
alleviate it to some degree in the following analyses. For the cross-section approach we 
cumulate the VAR money growth shocks over the period starting two years before the boom 
up to the year preceding and including the peak quarter of the boom. Effectively this amounts 
to normalising a monetary overhang measure to zero, two years before each boom episode. In 
                                                 
40 See the Annex for a description of results with different VARs, also excluding the exchange rate. 
41 This is in contradiction to common wisdom as exposed by e.g. Hamilton and many others, see 
Marcet (2005) for several citations. 
42 Including portfolio adjustment costs due to the lagged level of the money stock. 
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other words our liquidity measure is unaffected by velocity fluctuations during non-boom 
periods up to two years before each boom episode. In accumulating liquidity shocks we 
capture possibly slowly building monetary imbalances but with a restricted historical 
memory. Similarly, in the panel boom approach we use six quarter moving averages of our 
money growth rate shocks. Also here the implicit assumption is that what is relevant for 
driving asset prices are liquidity shocks over the last six quarters
43. We believe this 
methodology is more robust to innovations in the financial sector over time, which can make 
velocity both very volatile in the short run and susceptible to permanent low frequency level 
shifts. Recently Reynards (2006) has used an adjustment for equilibrium shifts in velocity 
based on similar reasoning in order to establish a positive role for money growth in predicting 
inflation for the US and the euro area for a sample including the 80s and 90s, where usually 
such a relationship would break down. According to Reynards (2006) the important 
adjustment of money growth rates is due to the change in interest rates associated with the 
disinflation period. Nelson (2003) has argued in a similar vein. We thus believe that allowing 
for velocity shifts related to interest rate movements is a crucial aspect of finding information 
content in monetary aggregates.   
 
It is difficult to judge in how far this VAR technology has been successful in cleaning our 
monteray shocks from endogenous developments in the economy and foremost from the 
business and real estate price cycles. The impulse responses of GDP and real estate prices on 
money have in most cases the expected positive sign so that during asset price boom periods, 
the derived money growth shocks are actually smoother than the actual money growth rate 
44.  
 
Charts 9 and 10 apply the methodology of section 3 and depict the median of high and low-
cost booms for the money and private credit based liquidity shocks. In Charts 9 and 10 shocks 
are cumulated over 4 quarters to be compared with the annualised figures in the previous 
charts in section 3. These Charts already provide a first impression that broad money might be 
a better indicator to explain post-boom recessions than private credit as the latter does not 
reveal significant differences across high and low-cost boom episodes. 
 
                                                 
43 See results for other accumulation lags in the Annex. 
44 Among the few exceptions, only 1 boom (Spain 1986-1991) is actually part of the panel boom 
analysis in section 6. However, excluding this particular boom even strengthens our results for money 
growth shocks.       
22
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 732 
February 2007 






































Degree of significance for the differences between high- and low-cost booms
High-cost booms
Low-cost booms










































Degree of significance for the differences between high- and low-cost booms
High-cost booms
Low-cost booms
period and group-specific medians
 
                 
 
 
5.  Cross-section bust analysis 
 
Our first approach is to run regressions to test whether liquidity shocks during boom periods 
helps explain the post-boom recession, while also controlling for other developments. This is 
a cross-section analysis where the sections are the boom episodes identified in Table 1. In 
order to check for robustness due to our small sample of boom episodes
45, we use robust 
regressions
46 and quantile regressions
47 besides standard OLS and IV methods.  
 
Basically we estimate the following set of cross-section equations: 
(2) 
yr (post-boom)n = β0 + β1  yr (boom)n + β2  boom lengthn + β3 rrpn
i + β4  ∆ Taylor gapn




                                                 
45 Subtracting the most recent boom in Australia, which was ongoing in 2004 Q4, so that we cannot 
determine the post-boom phase, leaves us with a sample of 41. 
46 Robust regression is a method which could be described as iteratively re-weighted least squares with 
the purpose to reduce the weights on outlier observations. The Stata procedure we use performs an 
initial screening based on Cooks distance and then performs Huber iterations followed by bi-weight 
iterations (see Stata manual for details). Compared to least squares robust regression offers protection 
against outlier data at the cost of some efficiency when the errors are normally distributed.  
47 Quantile regression minimises a weighted sum of absolute residuals and does not rely on the 
normality of error terms. See Koencker, R. (2005), “Quantile Regression”, Econometric Society 
Monographs, Cambridge University Press. For lack of space we only report the 20% quantile 
regression, which is an arbitrary but qualitatively non-crucial choice. The reason for focusing on lower 
quantiles is that we are particularly interested in capturing those recessions, which come closer to 
crises. By focusing on the 20% quantile we obtain a regression, which has 80% positive and only 20% 
negative residuals. It thus focuses on those booms, where post-boom growth was a particularly 
negative outlier with respect to the prediction of the right hand side variables. We use bootstrapped 
standard errors from 500 repetitions. 
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n are the 41 identified boom episodes. yr (post-boom) is average real GDP growth in the 8 
quarters following the boom period
48, yr (boom) is the average real GDP growth during the 
boom period [GDP growth av. boom in Tables 2-4 and A2-A5 in the annex], boom length is 
the length of the boom period in quarters, rrp
i can be either the cumulated rates of growth in 
real private residential property prices over the boom period [Housing growth cum] or the rate 
of change in the first post-boom year [Housing growth Post1]. Taylor gap
j is either the change 
in the Taylor gap between the year finishing the peak quarter of the boom and the first year 
before the boom (∆ Taylor gap boom) or the change in the Taylor gap between the second 
post-boom year and the peak quarter of the boom (∆ Taylor gap post). Cumulated liquidity
l 
stands alternatively for our previously derived liquidity shocks, i.e. the money and credit 
shocks cumulated over the period starting two years before the boom until the year finishing 
in the peak quarter of the aggregate asset price boom. We also show results for the simple 
cumulated real broad money and real private credit growth rates for comparison. 
 
In Tables 2-4 and Tables A2-A5 in the annex, the VAR liquidity shock measures are labelled, 
‘money shock cum’ and ‘credit shock cum’. We always control for the average real GDP 
growth during the boom, which in some sense proxies for time and country specific (fixed) 
effects, and the length of the boom in years. Generally, the longer the boom lasts, the more 
severe the GDP loss afterwards.  
 
The first important result of Tables 2-4 and Tables A2-A5 is that the monetary shock is 
negative and significant. The larger the liquidity shocks accumulated over the boom phase, 
the more lackluster is real GDP growth in the post-boom phase. Neither the cumulated private 
credit growth rate nor the private credit shocks are significant in any of the specifications of 
Tables 2-4 and Tables A2-A5, except for private credit growth in equation a3.4. Money based 
liquidity shocks add 7 percentage points of adjusted R
2 with least square estimation, see Table 
2, equation 2.3, 14 p.p. with the robust regressions, see Table A2, equation a2.3, and 15 p.p. 
with the 20% quantile regressions, see Table A3, equation a3.3 to the respective baseline 
specifications excluding liquidity shocks. 
 
Second, cumulated real estate price growth over the boom period is an important and robust 
variable to explain the post boom recessions.  
Third, money based liquidity and boom real estate price growth are, to some degree, collinear. 
Both coefficients are slightly smaller and less significant when included jointly. The money 
shock variable even looses significance in the robust regressions, see Table A2, once the 
boom real estate price growth variable is included. Nevertheless, both real estate and money 
                                                 
48 In the regression analyses, unlike for the graphical presentation of the stylised facts, we do not need 
any arbitrary classification of boom episodes into high and low-cost. 
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based liquidity shocks remain significant and money still contributes depending on the 
estimation method 3 and 11 percentage points of adjusted R
2 to the regression including boom 
housing price growth, see Tables 2 and A3, for least squares and the quantile regressions, 
respectively.  
 
Dependent variable: GDP growth av. post-boom
Equation 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10
Estimation method O L SO L SO L SO L SO L SO L SO L SO L SO L SO L S
GDP growth av. boom 0.51*** 0.65*** 0.53*** 0.55*** 0.51*** 0.49*** 0.58*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.49***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Boom length -0.32** -0.15 -0.24** -0.22 -0.32** -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07
(0.047) (0.234) (0.031) (0.206) (0.046) (0.645) (0.926) (0.692) (0.750) (0.641)
Housing growth cum -0.04** -0.03* -0.03* -0.04** -0.04**
(0.025) (0.074) (0.067) (0.030) (0.027)
Money growth cum. -0.03* -0.02
(0.052) (0.159)
Money shock cum. -0.10** -0.08**
(0.020) (0.027)
Priv. credit growth cum. -0.01 0.00
(0.362) (0.731)
Priv. Credit shock cum. 0.00 0.00
(0.896) (0.939)
Adjusted R-sq. 0.32   0.37   0.39   0.32   0.30 0.39   0.40   0.42   0.38   0.37
Pseudo R-sq - - - - - - - -
N .  o f  i n s t r u m e n t s ---- ----
Stars (***, **, *) denote the significance of the t-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. P-values in parentheses, 
derived from White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Table 2: Regressions explaining the average real GDP post-boom growth
 
 
Fourth, even when controlling for the drop in real residential property prices in the first post-
boom year (Housing growth Post1) the money growth shocks remain significant. The post-
boom drop in housing prices is instrumented by last boom period inflation, and the real estate 
price gap during the peak boom year (see Table 3). Interestingly, in the least square equations 
(Tables 2 and 3) the simple money growth rate looses significance when we control for any of 
the two types of housing price measures, contrary to the money growth shock variable. This 
could be interpreted as further evidence confirming the importance of the endogeneity of 
money growth with respect to housing prices. Certainly there is more information in our 
money shocks than can be captured purely by real estate price developments.  
 
Table 4 tests whether liquidity shocks contribute in explaining post-boom recessions even if 
one controls for another measure of the monetary policy stance. We expect tightening 
monetary policy during the boom to have a beneficial effect on real GDP growth in the post-
boom phase. ∆ Taylor gap boom should thus have a positive sign, as it is the case. We also 
control for monetary policy in the post boom phase itself (∆ Taylor gap post). The sign of ∆ 
Taylor gap post should be negative as loosening policy in the bust phase is most likely the 
optimal policy reaction to support growth. Monetary policy in the post-boom phase is 
instrumented by last boom period inflation, the real estate price gap during the peak boom 
year and Taylor gap in the last boom quarter. 
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Tables 4, A4 and A5 prove that the signs of the Taylor gaps are all as expected and significant 
(except for ∆ Taylor gap boom in the quantile regressions, which is of the correct sign but not 
significant). Most importantly, the money growth shocks always remain significant and the 
size of the coefficients are very stable across methods. This result is interesting in itself as it 
suggests that the New Keynesian approach of focusing on policy rules only featuring inflation 
and output gaps would neglect possibly important information, at least during asset price 
boom periods
49. Again credit growth shocks are not useful in explaining post-boom 
recessions.     
 
 
Dependent variable: GDP growth av. post-boom
Equation 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
Estimation method TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS
GDP growth av. boom 0.54*** 0.60*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.54***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Boom length -0.34*** -0.26** -0.28*** -0.31** -0.34***
(0.003) (0.043) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004)
Housing growth Post1 0.11** 0.1* 0.09* 0.10** 0.11**
(0.028) (0.069) (0.070) (0.049) (0.031)
Money growth cum. -0.02
(0.323)
Money shock cum. -0.07**
(0.045)
Priv. credit growth cum. 0.00
(0.752)
Priv. Credit shock cum. -0.01
(0.823)
Adjusted R-sq. 0.52   0.52   0.53   0.50   0.50
Pseudo R-sq - - - - -
N .  o f  i n s t r u m e n t s 45555
Stars (***, **, *) denote the significance of the t-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. P-values in parentheses, derived from White heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors.





Overall, the size of the money based liquidity shock coefficients are about -0.10, which is not 
trivial. Assuming for the sake of argument broad money would grow at 8% p.a. during a 3 
year asset price boom, while given economic conditions it should grow at 4.5% p.a. in 
equilibrium. Liquidity shocks would accumulate to 10.5% in this boom episode. The 
coefficient of 0.1 reveals that the post-boom drop in GDP due to this partial liquidity shock 
effect in this example is about 1% per annum for each of the two years following the boom.   
 
                                                 
49 Nelson (2003) has argued that money might influence inflation solely via aggregate demand. Thus a 
New Keynesian model with no explicit role for money in the IS curve might still be compatible with 
inflation being a monetary phenomenon. The evidence presented here refers to the additional 
information content of money as an indicator of future worries for the real economy.  
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Dependent variable: GDP growth av. post-boom
Equation 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS
GDP growth av. boom 0.61*** 0.72*** 0.62*** 0.63*** 0.61*** 0.53*** 0.68*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.53***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Boom length -0.29** -0.15 -0.22** -0.23 -0.29** -0.29* -0.10 -0.18* -0.20 -0.28*
(0.015) (0.213) (0.017) (0.180) (0.017) (0.062) (0.436) (0.079) (0.264) (0.065)
∆ Taylor gap boom 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
∆ Taylor gap post -0.10* -0.10* -0.12* -0.09* -0.10*
(0.086) (0.078) (0.060) (0.099) (0.082)
Money growth cum. -0.03** -0.04**
(0.050) (0.033)
Money shock cum. -0.09** -0.12***
(0.019) (0.008)
Priv. credit growth cum. -0.01 -0.01
(0.572) (0.474)
Priv. Credit shock cum. -0.01 -0.01
(0.890) (0.767)
Adjusted R-sq. 0.40   0.43   0.45   0.39   0.38 0.34 0.41 0.43 0.34 0.33
P s e u d o  R - s q ----------
N .  o f  i n s t r u m e n t s - - - - -56666
Stars (***, **, *) denote the significance of the t-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
P-values in parentheses, derived from White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.




The major differences between the money and credit based liquidity shocks deserve some 
comments. The fact that money growth shocks outperform private credit growth shocks could 
be due to several reasons. First, the data quality of the private credit series could be worse 
than for the broad money series. Private credit growth is definitely more volatile than broad 
money growth, which hinders finding a lot of significance. On the other hand, to the extent 
that higher volatility is not due to data errors but an intrinsic feature of credit data, this would 
justify relying more on money data for policy analysis. Second, the information content of 
money in boom episodes is simply higher because changes in net external assets and 
marketable instruments, which might affect asset prices, are reflected in money but not in 
credit
50. Adrian and Shin (2006) have recently argued that leverage targeting behaviour of 
banks can lead to a mutually reinforcing positive association between asset prices and money 
but not with credit, which is recorded at book value. Third, the VAR technology possibly 
manages to clean private credit much better than money from business and asset price cycles. 
But then we would expect the simple private credit growth rate to have a significant 
influence, which is not the case (except in equation a3.4). Fourth, total domestic credit might 
be the more appropriate credit measure than domestic private credit. Total domestic credit 
performs better than private credit in the cross section analysis although still significantly 
worse than money. But in light of the possible theoretical channels discussed in Section 2, it 
is difficult to find a reason why one should prefer total domestic over private credit. There is 
also no other supporting evidence that government deficits during the boom affect the depth 
of the post-boom recessions (see last row Table A1). The only reason might be that the break 
                                                 
50 E.g. capital inflows could increase net external assets of the domestic banking system as well as 
broad money while leaving domestic credit unchanged. These funds, previously invested abroad, might 
fuel a domestic housing price boom or bubble.  
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down of domestic credit into private and government credit is of very low quality. Using 
domestic credit could then capture private credit more accurately than the wrongly measured 
series for the subcomponent. Last but not least, if the monetarist channel of portfolio 
adjustments and the possible characteristic of money as aggregate index of investor 
uncertainty have some value, this will also favour money versus credit based liquidity shocks. 
We interpret the empirical results to suggest that what matters is a mixture of endogenous 
financial sector behaviour - and thus a temporary instability of broad money demand 
(conventionally measured) - and the monetary policy stance, which provides information 





6.  Panel boom analysis 
 
The previous cross-section analysis has shown that there still seems to be some collinearity 
between housing price developments and liquidity shocks during boom periods. In order to 
investigate whether the reason could be that liquidity is driving housing prices, we organised 
our data in a panel structure. The cross-section dimension is constituted by the identified 
booms. The time series dimension is the length of each boom episode.  
 
Gouteron and Szpiro (2005) pursue a similar objective. They run three variable country VARs 
or VECMs with real GDP, the real stock price or housing price level and the broad money to 
GDP or credit to GDP ratios for the euro area, US, UK and Japan. The authors check the 
impulse responses of their excess liquidity measures on real stock and real estate prices. Their 
conclusion is that, except for the UK with respect to housing prices, there is no robust 
influence of excess liquidity on asset prices. The contrast of this finding with ours, despite the 
fact that methodologies are also different, might well reflect the fact that we focus on 
aggregate asset price boom episodes.  
The explanatory power of liquidity shocks during boom episodes, of course, does not address 
the issue what triggered the asset price booms in the first place. Our intention is to test 
whether our liquidity shocks play a systematic, common role in explaining the housing price 
increases during the boom periods. However, other causes - inherent to each particular boom 
episode and potentially unobservable - may also be affecting their development. A simple, 
reasonable way to control for these effects while keeping attention to the common cause we 
want to investigate is the fixed effects model. It is well known, however, that such a model, if 
combined with lagged dependent variables, would render the estimated coefficients biased 
(although consistent if the number of periods becomes large with respect to the number of 
                                                 
51 The empirical results presented in this paper hold for M3, not for M1, not for M3-M1.  
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cross-sections), since it implies a non-zero correlation between the lagged dependent variable 
and the differentiated error term. Nickell (1981) shows that the order of magnitude of the bias 
is inversely proportional to the number of periods included in the estimation.  
The econometric literature has proposed several alternatives to overcome this problem. 
Perhaps the most popular recommendation has been the use of instrumental variables and 
GMM techniques. The Anderson-Hsiao estimator falls under the first class. Anderson and 
Hsiao suggested to differentiate the model and to use a previous lag of either the difference or 
the level of the endogenous variables as instruments. The original Arellano-Bond (1991) 
estimator and its successors, Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), make use 
of additional moment conditions and thus can handle different number of instruments for each 
observation. These estimators, although more efficient than those of the Anderson-Hsiao 
class, have been designed for an environment of very short time dimension and large cross-
section dimension, and they lack consistency if this condition does not hold. Additionally, a 
central problem with any estimator involving the use of instruments is that the quality of the 
estimation very much depends on the correlation between the instruments and the 
instrumented variables.   
Given the characteristics of our dataset, 42 boom episodes of different length, up to 39 
quarters, the use of an Arellano-Bond type estimator does not seem advisable from an 
econometric point of view, as N is small and T too large. The Anderson-Hsiao and the fixed 
effects plus lagged dependent variable methods would be more recommended if the number 
of periods we are dealing with were sufficiently large relative to the number of cross-sections. 
In such a case we would be confronted with a trade-off between the size of the bias of the 
fixed effects estimator and the poor efficiency of the Anderson-Hsiao estimator. Beck and 
Katz (2004) perform several Monte Carlo experiments to study this trade-off. They conclude 
that while the Anderson-Hsiao estimator is unbiased, its performance in terms of root mean 
square error is very poor. On the other hand, the bias of the fixed effects estimator very 
quickly enters a region where it can be considered tolerable. In particular, for the case of 
about 20 cross-sections, 30 periods and a true coefficient of the lagged dependent variable of 
about 0.2, the upward bias of the coefficient of the explanatory variable is only about 2%
52.  
Against this background we decided to use the fixed effects and lagged dependent variable 
model and to focus on the longer boom episodes, adding the first year before the booms, in 
order to increase the number of time periods and thus contain the bias in the coefficient 
                                                 
52 Kiviet (1995) and Bun and Kiviet (2003)  propose to estimate the bias of the fixed effect estimator 
and use it to correct its estimates. This approach, although theoretically appealing, presents some 
practical problems, especially because the formula to estimate the bias requires knowledge of the true 
parameters. Bruno (2005a and 2005b) provides the basis for correcting also unbalanced panels. 
Importantly, he also showed that the size of the bias is still mainly determined by a function 
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estimates discussed above. Thus the panel estimates discussed below use only those booms 
with a length of at least 3 years, leaving us with 16 boom episodes
53.  
  
We estimate the following set of panel regressions: 
 
(3) 
t n t n t n
a
a t n a t n x rrp rrp , 1 ,
6
1
, , ' ν λ η γ β + + + + = −
=
− ∑                  
 
and n = 1,….,16;         t = bq-4, bq-3, …,bqlast 
 
where rrp stands for the quarterly growth rate in real private residential property prices. The 
cross-section dimension n  is constituted by the 16 boom episodes of at least three years 
length. The time dimension t starts four quarters before the boom period (bq=boom quarters) 
and lasts up to the last quarter of the aggregate asset price boom. As booms are of different 
length we have an unbalanced panel. We later compare the boom panel results with panel 
estimates including the whole sample (overall panel) where the cross-section dimension, i is 
formed by the 18 countries and the time dimension runs from 1972 Q1 up to 2004 Q4, as 
specified in equation (4).  
 
(4) 
t i t i t i
a
a t i a t i x rrp rrp , 1 ,
8
1
, , ' ν λ η γ β + + + + = −
=
− ∑                  
 
and i = 1,….,18;         t = 1972Q1,…,2004Q4 
 
 
All variables in the k-dimensional vectors of explanatory variables xn,t and xi,t are lagged by 
one quarter. The vector includes the following variables, the six quarter moving average of 
quarterly real GDP growth (@ GDP growth)
54, the change in the nominal long term interest 
rate (∆ long term interest rate) and alternating the money and credit based liquidity shocks, as 
                                                 
53 The results do not change a lot once we double the number of booms by considering all booms which 
last at least 2 years. We would then be left with 30 booms. Unfortunately this reduces the average 
number of time periods from 20 to 15 and according to Beck and Katz (2004) increases the bias to 
about 3.5% (we have to rely on a table with constant N=20). This is likely to be a lower boundary of 
the increase in the bias as the increasing degree of unbalancedness is not taken into account.     
54 Instead of GDP we alternatively used a cumulated change in the unemployment rate. Results were 
similar to a degree that they are not worth reporting. We also used different lags for the accumulation 
of liquidity shocks and GDP growth. The money growth shock coefficients reported in Table A11 in 
the Annex reveal that the principle of accumulating imbalances is important and that the results are 
robust with respect to lag length. Coefficient size and significance is though stronger for lag 6 than for 
smaller lags.    
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well as real money and real private credit growth rates. The liquidity shocks are derived as 
before only that here we use the six quarter moving average (indicated by @ in the tables). 
E.g. ‘@ money shock’ is the six quarter moving average of the structural M3 shock derived 
from the VAR shown in equation (1). By averaging we first of all smooth the information 
contained in liquidity growth and second we relax our extreme assumption that velocity shift 
bygones are bygones on a quarterly basis. In order to capture the dynamics of housing prices 
we use six lags of the endogenous variable for the boom panel estimates and eight lags for the 
whole sample panel estimates. This specification guarantees well behaved residuals across all 
different models.      
 
In the output tables we show besides the pooled estimations for comparison, results using 
cross-section fixed effects (CS; λt=0 in (3) and (4)) and either in addition period fixed effects 
(CS+P) or real time fixed effects (CS+RT; here λt=0 but we add dummies for calendar years). 
Period fixed effects here assume that there is a common period effect on the growth of real 
estate prices, depending on the specific quarter of the boom, for example the first or last 
quarter of the boom. Alternatively, one could assume that there exists a real time fixed effect, 
which means that there is a common effect on property price growth rates with respect to the 
calendar time, which is relevant when several booms happen at the same time in different 
countries and asset prices are driven by some joined, unobserved event like financial 
liberalisation at the international level. This is likely to be important as several of our booms 
occurred either in the late 80s or the late 90s. By allowing for what we call real time fixed 
effects
55 we safeguard against the possibility that (common) global trends drive our results. 
We do not report the real time fixed effects dummies for the sake of readability of our tables 
but it should be noted that usually for the years 1983-1990 and sometimes also in 1999 they 
are highly significant and positive. This confirms the importance of controlling for real time 
effects. We also give particular importance to the cross section plus real time fixed effects 
model, as several authors have highlighted that money growth was unusually strong in the 
disinflationary period due to the trend reduction in interest rates
56. We safeguard against the 
possibility of spurious correlation between liquidity and asset prices by, first of all, correcting 
for among other things the change of interest rates in our derivation of liquidity shocks as 
explained in Section 4 and second by including the mentioned real time dummies.    
The standard errors reported are the SUR panel corrected standard errors as recommended by 
Beck and Katz (1995). 
 
The panel estimates for the boom episodes show that the effect of the money growth shocks is 
sizable and significant across all estimated models (Tables 5, A6 and A7). Money based 
                                                 
55 We include time dummies which are annual in the sense that we have one dummy for the four 
quarters of 1980, 1981 etc, until the year 2000. 
56 See e.g. Nelson (2003) and Reynard (2006). 
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liquidity shocks are significant at the 1% level for most of the models. The moving average of 
the structural VAR shock has a coefficient between 1.2 and 1.5 (abstracting from the pooled 
OLS and System GMM estimations, where the coefficient is close to 1). This means that if 
the average money growth shock over the last six quarters has been 1 percent, real residential 
property prices will grow between 1.2% and 1.5% the next quarter, which is again a sizable 
effect. The contribution of liquidity shocks to the adjusted R
2, once we control for GDP and 
the change in nominal long term interest rates, is though small, which means between 1 and 2 
percentage points. This though should not be surprising give the fact that this is a panel 
estimation with highly significant lagged endogenous variables in the equation. Furthermore, 
we are explaining an asset return. The credit based liquidity measure is only significant for 
the two least preferred models, i.e. the pooled and simple cross-section fixed effects 
specifications, with coefficients half the size of the money shocks. The credit shocks are 
never significant in the more reliable period or real time fixed effects specifications. 
Interestingly, the change in the long-term interest rate is only significant for the pooled and 
the cross-section plus period fixed effects specifications in which case GDP is not. Vice 
versa, in the cross-section plus real time fixed effects model (and the system GMM 
estimations) interest rates are not significant but GDP is. This pattern suggests that the 
significance of interest rates might only be due to the disinflation and financial liberalisation 
periods. 
 
Dependent variable: housing price growth
Equation 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10
Estimation method CS+P CS+P CS+P CS+P CS+P CS+RT CS+RT CS+RT CS+RT CS+RT
Housing price growth (-1) 0.18** 0.16** 0.16** 0.18** 0.18** 0.15* 0.13 0.12 0.14* 0.15*
(0.029) (0.049) (0.048) (0.033) (0.024) (0.063) (0.105) (0.105) (0.070) (0.056)
Housing price growth (-2) -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
(0.636) (0.491) (0.505) (0.578) (0.623) (0.810) (0.622) (0.691) (0.742) (0.816)
Housing price growth (-3) 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
(0.705) (0.935) (0.887) (0.841) (0.695) (0.785) (0.542) (0.639) (0.657) (0.793)
Housing price growth (-4) 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.25***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Housing price growth (-5) -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.25*** -0.24*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.20*** -0.23*** -0.22***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006)
Housing price growth (-6) -0.10 -0.11 -0.1 -0.12 -0.09 -0.14* -0.15* -0.13 -0.15* -0.13
(0.217) (0.174) (0.244) (0.163) (0.261) (0.088) (0.061) (0.100) (0.059) (0.103)
@ GDP growth (-1) 0.71 0.57 0.71 0.57 0.60 1.15* 1.06* 1.24** 1.06* 1.09*
(0.140) (0.234) (0.133) (0.236) (0.204) (0.051) (0.070) (0.035) (0.069) (0.061)
∆long term interest rate (-1) -0.46** -0.43* -0.43* -0.48** -0.49** -0.24 -0.24 -0.25 -0.26 -0.27
(0.048) (0.070) (0.067) (0.040) (0.034) (0.318) (0.319) (0.310) (0.273) (0.263)
@ Money growth (-1) 0.39** 0.52**
(0.036) (0.016)
@ Money shock (-1) 1.16*** 1.36***
(0.009) (0.005)
@ Priv. credit growth (-1) 0.25 0.25
(0.192) (0.167)
@ Priv. Credit shock (-1) 0.65 0.52
(0.120) (0.218)
Adj. R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19
N. of observations 386 386 386 386 386 383 383 383 383 383
Av. N. of periods 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
N. of cross sections 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
The @ sign stands for six-quarter moving average.
CS+P: LS cross-section and period fixed effects; CS+RT: LS cross-section and real-time fixed effects. 
Stars (***, **, *) denote the significance of the t-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. P-values in parentheses.
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors used for both CS+P and CS+RT estimations.
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The money growth shock variable is the only variable which remains significant across all 
specifications – besides real money growth, which though suffers from the endogeneity 
problem.  
 
Simply for the sake of comparison, we also run system GMM estimations (Blundell and Bond 
(1998)) with all 42 boom episodes, while reducing the number of time periods by aggregating 
the quarterly into annual observations and starting with the first year before the boom. We 
intend to render the time dimension as small as possible compared to the cross-section 
dimension
57. As here we deal with several short booms and due to the fact that we use annual 
data (aggregated growth rates over 4 quarters), we use the contemporaneous shock variables 
as right hand side variables
58. The results reported in Table A7 show more or less the same 
features as reported above. The private credit shock as opposed to the money growth shock is 
again not significant. In general though, the GMM estimations appear little robust, depending 
on the chosen instruments and sample periods. The brief discussion above explained why for 
this purpose we do not rely on these estimates to investigate the effects of liquidity shocks on 
housing prices.  
 
It is interesting to compare these estimates with the pooled, cross-section fixed effects and 
cross-section and period fixed effects models for the whole sample period as shown in Tables 
6 and A8. Here the cross-sections are the 18 countries and the sample period runs from 1972 
Q1 (due to lags of the endogenous variable) until 2004 Q4. Only the money and not the credit 
shock is significant and this holds again for all models. Still there are important differences. 
The size of the money based liquidity coefficients is four to five times smaller than for the 
boom panel models. The marginal contribution in terms of adjusted R
2  is zero. The 
significance of the control variables, GDP and interest rates strongly increases for the whole 
sample estimates. Now both of them are always significant at the 1% level. The size of the 
control coefficients remains about the same or even slightly increases. This suggests that 
overall real estate prices can be better explained (adjusted R
2 between 0.31 and 0.34) when 
normal times are included in the sample and the usual suspects like income and interest rates 
are really important. During aggregate asset price boom periods, real property price growth is 
more difficult to account for (adjusted R
2 between 0.20 and 0.28) but liquidity shocks play a 
relatively more important role while the standard variables lose in importance
59.     
                                                 
57 We use a correction to the two-step covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005) according to 
Roodman (2005) (XTABOND2 Stata module). Without this correction, the two-step estimates of the 
standard errors tend to be severely downward biased in small samples.   
58 According to the GMM estimation method, all the variables are dynamically instrumented with their 
own level lags and lagged differences (lag 2 in our particular case).  
59 The difference between boom episodes and the whole sample is slightly diminished once shorter 
booms of at least two years are also included in the boom panel. So it could be that these differences 
are mainly due to longer booms which generate their own dynamics and where asset prices are likely to 
be more detached from fundamentals. We also use the Stata routine provided by Bruno (2005b) to 
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Table 6: Regressions explaining real housing price growth 
(overall sample)
Dependent variable: housing price growth
Equation 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5
Estimation method CS+P CS+P CS+P CS+P CS+P
Housing price growth (-1) 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.35***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Housing price growth (-2) 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.945) (0.946) (0.714) (0.959) (0.788)
Housing price growth (-3) 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.341) (0.422) (0.372) (0.353) (0.385)
Housing price growth (-4) 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Housing price growth (-5) -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.14***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Housing price growth (-6) -0.05* -0.05* -0.04 -0.05* -0.04
(0.095) (0.065) (0.128) (0.090) (0.151)
Housing price growth (-7) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.937) (0.949) (0.982) (0.912) (0.949)
Housing price growth (-8) 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
@ GDP growth (-1) 0.83*** 0.74*** 0.91*** 0.82*** 0.93***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆long term interest rate (-1) -0.45*** -0.45*** -0.46*** -0.46*** -0.47***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
@ Money growth (-1) 0.15**
(0.015)
@ Money shock (-1) 0.30*
(0.056)
@ Priv. credit growth (-1) 0.02
(0.709)
@ Priv. Credit shock (-1) 0.05
(0.679)
Adj. R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
N. of observations 2354 2338 2269 2354 2285
Av. N. of periods 131 130 126 131 127
N. of cross sections 18 18 18 18 18
The @ sign stands for six-quarter moving average.
CS+P: LS cross-section and period fixed effects.
Stars (***, **, *) denote the significance of the t-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
P-values in parentheses, derived from cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors.  
 
Finally, we investigate whether liquidity shocks would also explain consumer price inflation 
over the whole sample or during asset price boom episodes in Tables A9 and A10. We used 
the same set of regressors, except for the long-term interest rate, which was not significant 
and had a wrong (positive) sign
60. Over the whole sample period, both money and credit 
growth shocks have a significant positive impact on inflation in the next quarter. They also 
add considerable explanatory power to the baseline regressions
61. This is independent of the 
estimation method chosen, although we only report the cross-section plus period fixed effects 
model in Table A10. Interestingly, the link between liquidity shocks and consumer price 
inflation completely breaks down for the boom episodes (see Table A9). Assumingly, this is 
due to the fact that during boom episodes liquidity shocks are mainly unwound via its effects 
                                                                                                                                            
correct the bias from least square dummy variable (LSDV) estimations for unbalanced panels. The 
results and the significance is again very similar to the results described in this paper. Therefore and 
because the routine is designed for 1 lagged dependent variable while we have six, we do not report 
these results.  
60 The change in the short term rates also has a positive sign, so we omitted interest rates altogether. 
61 See Rüffer and Stracca (2006) who find effects of global excess liquidity on inflation. 
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on rising asset prices as argued above. This suggests the hypothesis that there exists a trade-
off of liquidity shocks’ explanatory power with respect to consumer price and asset price 
inflation, the nature of which depends on whether the economy is in a boom or non-boom 
phase. The results presented in Tables A9 and A10 support this hypothesis of course only up 
to the degree one lends credence to in-sample analyses. Investigating this issue further, e.g. by 
means of regime switching models or coefficient constraints in SUR estimations using real-
time data is beyond the scope of the current paper.  
We conclude this section with one final remark on the different effects of credit based and 
money based liquidity shocks. There is some evidence, at least for the euro area, that 
especially the more permanent swings in broad money growth are particularly correlated with 
private credit growth, narrow money growth, and also money growth of the household sector. 
Under the hypothesis that liquidity shocks should rather drive the transitory and not the 
permanent component of real housing prices, this would potentially provide an additional 
explanation why credit growth does not contribute to predict housing returns. This hypothesis 
requires further investigation. 
      
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
We identify 42 aggregate asset price boom episodes for 18 OECD countries since the 1970s. 
We then compute the average behaviour over the boom-bust cycles for a host of 
macroeconomic variables. In particular, we focus on stylised differences between benign 
(low-cost in terms of post-boom real GDP growth) and serious (high-cost) boom episodes. 
These stylised facts suggest the importance of real estate prices and money and credit 
developments for the boom-bust derailment. After mechanically cleaning broad money and 
private credit growth rates from all kinds of endogeneity problems due to business or asset 
price cycles by means of VAR technology, we then use a suite of econometric techniques 
among which a cross-section bust analysis employing standard OLS and IV, quantile 
regression and robust regression, and a panel boom analysis mainly relying on a fixed-effect 
cum lagged dependent variable model (LSDV-model). The regression analyses allow us to 
confirm and elaborate on the hypothesis derived from the results on significant differences 
between high and low-cost boom episodes. Money growth shocks during the boom and pre-
boom periods contribute to explaining the depth of post-boom recessions even if one controls 
for housing price developments during the boom and in the post-boom phase, and for the 
monetary policy stance measured by means of deviations from a Taylor-rule during the boom 
and in the post-boom phase. Real residential property price developments during the boom 
and in the post-boom phase are an important and robust factor to explain post-boom 
recessions. Part of the information content of money to explain post-boom recessions does 
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indeed come from the effect of liquidity shocks on real residential housing prices during the 
boom period. While all these results hold for broad money growth, nearly no informational 
content is found for private credit growth. These results are derived conditional on 
experiencing an aggregate asset price boom. A panel analysis using the whole sample, i.e. all 
boom and non-boom periods available for each country, shows a much weaker relationship 
between liquidity shocks and asset price inflation and other more standard variables like 
income and interest rates gain in relative importance. Switching the endogenous variable from 
the rate of change of real housing prices to consumer price inflation reveals the opposite 
pattern. Liquidity shocks seem to contribute to explaining consumer price inflation only for 
the whole sample but not when restricting to the boom episodes.  
Due to the well known problems of econometric identification, caution is nevertheless 
warranted wherever a causal interpretation is suggested. The paper is purely empirical. A 
combination of pragmatic monetarism, allowing for frequent shifts in velocity and focusing 
on broad money, possibly reinforced by agency problems between financial market 
participants though might provide an - in terms of its microfoundations loose - theoretical 
explanation for our findings. Further research would have to show whether these findings 
would prove to be useful for central banks implementing policy in real time. At this stage, the 
findings seem to support the importance the ECB attaches to its monetary analysis in general 
and to the analysis of broad money growth in particular in its quest to maintain price stability 
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February 2007Dependent variable: GDP growth av. post-boom
Equation a2.1 a2.2 a2.3 a2.4 a2.5 a2.6 a2.7 a2.8 a2.9 a2.10
Estimation method Rreg Rreg Rreg Rreg Rreg Rreg Rreg Rreg Rreg Rreg
GDP growth av. boom 0.47*** 0.64*** 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.59*** 0.53*** 0.51*** 0.50
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Boom length -0.10 -0.14 -0.23* -0.17 -0.25** -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.03
(0.420) (0.334) (0.060) (0.335) (0.043) (0.905) (0.940) (0.931) (0.979) (0.871)
Housing growth cum -0.04** -0.04 -0.04* -0.04* -0.04**
(0.039) (0.115) (0.084) (0.064) (0.041)
Money growth cum. -0.03* -0.02
(0.064) (0.232)
Money shock cum. -0.10** -0.08
(0.046) (0.139)
Priv. credit growth cum. -0.01 0.00
(0.471) (0.820)
Priv. Credit shock cum. 0.00 0.00
(0.986) (0.920)
Adjusted R-sq. 0.20 0.33 0.34 0.23 0.22 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.30 0.31
Pseudo R-sq - - - - - - - - - -
N .  o f  i n s t r u m e n t s ----------
Stars (***, **, *) denote the significance of the t-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. P-values in parentheses.
Table A2: Regressions explaining the average real GDP post-boom growth: Robust regressions
 
 
Dependent variable: GDP growth av. post-boom
Equation a3.1 a3.2 a3.3 a3.4 a3.5 a3.6 a3.7 a3.8 a3.9 a3.10
Estimation method Q(20) Q(20) Q(20) Q(20) Q(20) Q(20) Q(20) Q(20) Q(20) Q(20)
GDP growth av. boom 0.27 0.71*** 0.40** 0.58** 0.27 0.53** 0.76 0.63*** 0.61** 0.58**
(0.330) (0.001) (0.039) (0.025) (0.298) (0.024) (0.000) (0.001) (0.015) (0.026)
Boom length -0.40 -0.01 -0.22 -0.18 -0.33 0.06 0.16 0.10 -0.03 0.07
(0.145) (0.957) (0.166) (0.444) (0.220) (0.781) (0.238) (0.525) (0.876) (0.719)
Housing growth cum -0.06*** -0.03* -0.05** -0.02 -0.05*
(0.008) (0.073) (0.012) (0.396) (0.032)
Money growth cum. -0.06*** -0.05**
(0.005) (0.045)
Money shock cum. -0.12** -0.10**
(0.017) (0.043)
Priv. credit growth cum. -0.04** -0.03
(0.049) (0.207)
Priv. Credit shock cum. -0.07 -0.06
(0.405) (0.416)
A d j u s t e d  R - s q . ----------
Pseudo R-sq 0.15 0.34 0.30 0.23 0.18 0.27 0.40 0.38 0.28 0.29
N .  o f  i n s t r u m e n t s ----------
Stars (***, **, *) denote the significance of the t-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
P-values in parentheses, derived from bootstrapped standard errors with 500 iterations.
Table A3: Regressions explaining the average real GDP post-boom growth: Quantile regressions
 
 
Dependent variable: GDP growth av. post-boom
Equation a4.1 a4.2 a4.3 a4.4 a4.5
Estimation method Rreg Rreg Rreg Rreg Rreg
GDP growth av. boom 0.61*** 0.74*** 0.63*** 0.64*** 0.61***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Boom length -0.26** -0.12 -0.21* -0.20 -0.23**
(0.021) (0.366) (0.073) (0.224) (0.032)
∆ Taylor gap boom 0.13** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.13**
(0.020) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.023)
Money growth cum. -0.03*
(0.089)
Money shock cum. -0.09*
(0.070)
Priv. credit growth cum. -0.01
(0.565)
Priv. Credit shock cum. -0.01
(0.871)
A d j u s t e d  R - s q . 0 . 3 60 . 4 20 . 4 30 . 3 70 . 3 6
Pseudo R-sq - - - - -
N. of instruments - - - - -
Stars (***, **, *) denote the significance of the t-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
 respectively. P-values in parentheses.
Table A4: Regressions explaining the average real GDP post-
boom growth: Robust regressions
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Dependent variable: GDP growth av. post-boom
Equation a5.1 a5.2 a5.3 a5.4 a5.5
Estimation method Q(20) Q(20) Q(20) Q(20) Q(20)
GDP growth av. boom 0.58** 0.88 0.45** 0.67 0.62**
(0.019) (0.000) (0.048) (0.008) (0.014)
Boom length -0.42* 0.03 -0.25 -0.28 -0.44*
(0.051) (0.849) (0.102) (0.319) (0.057)
∆ Taylor gap boom 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.13
(0.140) (0.346) (0.559) (0.429) (0.136)
Money growth cum. -0.05***
(0.007)
Money shock cum. -0.10*
(0.064)
Priv. credit growth cum. -0.02
(0.452)
Priv. Credit shock cum. 0.03
(0.800)
A d j u s t e d  R - s q . -----
Pseudo R-sq 0.24 0.38 0.32 0.25 0.24
N. of instruments - - -
Stars (***, **, *) denote the significance of the t-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
P-values in parentheses, derived from bootstrapped standard errors with 500 iterations.
Table A5: Regressions explaining the average real GDP post-





Dependent variable: housing price growth
Equation a6.1 a6.2 a6.3 a6.4 a6.5 a6.6 a6.7 a6.8 a6.9 a6.10
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS CS CS CS CS CS
Housing price growth (-1) 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.21*** 0.19** 0.18** 0.20*** 0.21***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.004)
Housing price growth (-2) 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.390) (0.564) (0.547) (0.423) (0.410) (0.715) (0.999) (0.943) (0.860) (0.744)
Housing price growth (-3) 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03
(0.281) (0.463) (0.417) (0.361) (0.306) (0.635) (0.990) (0.889) (0.940) (0.669)
Housing price growth (-4) 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.3*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.29***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Housing price growth (-5) -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18** -0.20** -0.18** -0.22*** -0.19**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.006) (0.013)
Housing price growth (-6) -0.10* -0.11* -0.10* -0.11** -0.10 -0.12 -0.13* -0.11 -0.15** -0.12
(0.068) (0.053) (0.081) (0.046) (0.070) (0.122) (0.076) (0.127) (0.048) (0.132)
@ GDP growth (-1) 0.43* 0.12 0.41 0.29 0.35 0.74 0.54 0.74 0.52 0.62
(0.094) (0.677) (0.110) (0.316) (0.176) (0.124) (0.251) (0.115) (0.273) (0.195)
∆long term interest rate (-1) -0.35* -0.32 -0.35* -0.37* -0.38* -0.28 -0.26 -0.27 -0.31 -0.32
(0.078) (0.110) (0.076) (0.065) (0.059) (0.197) (0.237) (0.217) (0.159) (0.150)
@ Money growth (-1) 0.29** 0.55***
(0.019) (0.004)
@ Money shock (-1) 0.86*** 1.50***
(0.005) (0.001)
@ Priv. credit growth (-1) 0.12 0.35**
(0.256) (0.022)
@ Priv. Credit shock (-1) 0.48* 0.72*
(0.086) (0.071)
A d j .  R - s q u a r e d 0 . 1 80 . 1 90 . 2 00 . 1 80 . 1 90 . 1 70 . 1 90 . 2 00 . 1 80 . 1 8
N. of observations 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386
A v .  N .  o f  p e r i o d s 2 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 4
N. of cross sections 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
The @ sign stands for six-quarter moving average.
OLS: OLS pooled estimation; CS: LS cross-section fixed effects. 
Stars (***, **, *) denote the significance of the t-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. P-values in parentheses. 
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors used for the CS estimations.
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Dependent variable: housing price growth (annual frequency)
Equation a7.1 a7.2 a7.3 a7.4 a7.5
Estimation method SysGMM SysGMM SysGMM SysGMM SysGMM
Housing price growth (-1) 0.49*** 0.38*** 0.43*** 0.35*** 0.46***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growth 1.08** 0.55 0.85* 0.92** 1.10**
(0.039) (0.303) (0.080) (0.049) (0.025)
∆long term interest rate  -0.39 0.14 -0.39 0.15 -0.02
(0.650) (0.867) (0.640) (0.868) (0.983)
Money growth 0.45**
(0.042)
Money shock  1.00**
(0.028)
Priv. credit growth 0.24*
(0.083)
Priv. Credit shock  -0.48
(0.202)
N. of groups 42 42 42 42 42
N. of observations 156 156 154 156 155
Av. N. of periods 4 4 4 4 4
N .  o f  i n s t r u m e n t s 5 46 96 96 96 9
Test of 1st. order serial corr. (p-value) 0.030 0.041 0.021 0.049 0.026
Test of 2st. order serial corr. (p-value) 0.874 0.888 0.586 0.569 0.804
Test of overid. restrictions (p-value) 0.955 0.997 0.997 0.999 0.991
SysGMM: system GMM.
Stars (***, **, *) denote the significance of the t-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
P-values in parentheses, derived from Windmeijer's corrected two-step covariance matrix.





Dependent variable: housing price growth
Equation a8.1 a8.2 a8.3 a8.4 a8.5 a8.6 a8.7 a8.8 a8.9 a8.10
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS CS CS CS CS CS
Housing price growth (-1) 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.38***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Housing price growth (-2) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
(0.345) (0.528) (0.743) (0.390) (0.652) (0.527) (0.717) (0.879) (0.573) (0.805)
Housing price growth (-3) 0.05** 0.04 0.05** 0.04* 0.05** 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.042) (0.105) (0.033) (0.053) (0.038) (0.135) (0.248) (0.112) (0.156) (0.120)
Housing price growth (-4) 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Housing price growth (-5) -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.14***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Housing price growth (-6) -0.05** -0.06** -0.04* -0.05** -0.04* -0.05** -0.06** -0.04* -0.06** -0.04
(0.017) (0.011) (0.051) (0.012) (0.056) (0.044) (0.032) (0.098) (0.034) (0.104)
Housing price growth (-7) 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.855) (0.886) (0.871) (0.755) (0.877) (0.839) (0.859) (0.853) (0.758) (0.854)
Housing price growth (-8) 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
@ GDP growth (-1) 0.61*** 0.49*** 0.64*** 0.56*** 0.64*** 0.70*** 0.55*** 0.71*** 0.65*** 0.73***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆long term interest rate (-1) -0.52*** -0.5*** -0.53*** -0.52*** -0.53*** -0.52*** -0.5*** -0.53*** -0.52*** -0.53***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
@ Money growth (-1) 0.22*** 0.23***
(0.000) (0.000)
@ Money shock (-1) 0.30** 0.30*
(0.038) (0.052)
@ Priv. credit growth (-1) 0.05 0.05
(0.182) (0.251)
@ Priv. Credit shock (-1) 0.05 0.05
(0.618) (0.687)
A d j .  R - s q u a r e d 0 . 3 10 . 3 20 . 3 10 . 3 10 . 3 10 . 3 10 . 3 10 . 3 10 . 3 10 . 3 1
N. of observations 2354 2338 2269 2354 2285 2354 2338 2269 2354 2285
Av. N. of periods 131 130 126 131 127 131 130 126 131 127
N. of cross sections 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
The @ sign stands for six-quarter moving average.
OLS: OLS pooled estimation; CS: LS cross-section fixed effects. 
Stars (***, **, *) denote the significance of the t-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. P-values in parentheses. 
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors used for the CS estimations.




Working Paper Series No 732 
February 2007 
Dependent variable: consumer price inflation
Equation a9.1 a9.2 a9.3 a9.4 a9.5 a9.6 a9.7 a9.8 a9.9 a9.10
Estimation method CS+P CS+P CS+P CS+P CS+P CS+RT CS+RT CS+RT CS+RT CS+RT
Consumer price inflation (-1) 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.572) (0.512) (0.590) (0.547) (0.574)
Consumer price inflation (-2) 0.13* 0.14* 0.13 0.13* 0.13* 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.098) (0.071) (0.100) (0.099) (0.098) (0.947) (0.964) (0.931) (0.947) (0.943)
Consumer price inflation (-3) -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.16** -0.15** -0.16** -0.15** -0.16**
(0.578) (0.709) (0.585) (0.675) (0.584) (0.019) (0.030) (0.019) (0.031) (0.022)
Consumer price inflation (-4) 0.5*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.50*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.44***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Consumer price inflation (-5) -0.25*** -0.23*** -0.25*** -0.23*** -0.25*** -0.19** -0.18** -0.19** -0.18** -0.19**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) (0.021) (0.015)
Consumer price inflation (-6) -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.944) (0.940) (0.946) (0.893) (0.948) (0.912) (0.985) (0.904) (0.972) (0.933)
@ GDP growth (-1) 0.17* 0.16 0.17* 0.15 0.17* 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
(0.092) (0.129) (0.092) (0.141) (0.093) (0.610) (0.655) (0.617) (0.723) (0.617)
@ Money growth (-1) 0.06 0.03
(0.195) (0.494)
@ Money shock (-1) 0.01 -0.02
(0.943) (0.866)
@ Priv. credit growth (-1) 0.05 0.03
(0.267) (0.386)
@ Priv. Credit shock (-1) 0.01 0.02
(0.950) (0.783)
Adj. R-squared 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
N. of observations 375 375 375 375 375 372 372 372 372 372
Av. N. of periods 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
N. of cross sections  16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
The @ sign stands for six-quarter moving average.
CS+P: LS cross-section and period fixed effects; CS+RT: cross-section and real-time fixed effects. 
Stars (***, **, *) denote the significance of the t-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
P-values in parentheses derived from cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors.
Table A9: Regressions explaining consumer price inflation during boom episodes
 
 
Dependent variable: consumer price inflation
Equation a10.1 a10.2 a10.3 a10.4 a10.5
Estimation method CS+P CS+P CS+P CS+P CS+P
Consumer price inflation (-1) 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.26***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Consumer price inflation (-2) 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.13***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Consumer price inflation (-3) 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.13***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Consumer price inflation (-4) 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.14*** 0.18***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Consumer price inflation (-5) -0.06*** -0.06** -0.07** -0.06** -0.07***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.010)
Consumer price inflation (-6) 0.06*** 0.04 0.04 0.07*** 0.04
(0.007) (0.111) (0.109) (0.003) (0.146)
Consumer price inflation (-7) -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
(0.223) (0.159) (0.169) (0.237) (0.247)
Consumer price inflation (-8) 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.15***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
@ GDP growth (-1) 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.19***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
@ Money growth (-1) 0.05***
(0.010)
@ Money shock (-1) 0.11**
(0.034)
@ Priv. credit growth (-1) 0.04***
(0.000)
@ Priv. Credit shock (-1) 0.08**
(0.028)
Adj. R-squared 0.69 0.73 0.74 0.7 0.74
N. of observations 3004 2576 2259 2927 2275
Av. N. of periods 167 143 126 163 126
N. of cross sections 18 18 18 18 18
The @ sign stands for six-quarter moving average.
CS+P: LS cross-section and period fixed effects.
Stars (***, **, *) denote the significance of the t-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
P-values in parentheses derived from cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors.
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Table A11: Robustness of liquidity shock (@money shock(-1) coefficient) across estimation methods 
 
CS: LS cross-section fixed effects; CS+P: LS cross-section and period fixed effects; CS+RT: LS cross-section 
and real-time fixed effects. 
Stars (***,**,*) denote the significance of the t-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. P-values in 
parenthesis derived from cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors. 
The accumulated lags for the control variable real GDP growth (not reported) always corresponds to the 
number of lags for the money growth shocks. The lags of the endogenous variable (not reported) were kept 
constant at 6.  
 
 
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test        
 
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is a non-parametric test for differences in populations. The 
assumptions are simply that each sample is a random sample from the population it represents, that 
the two samples are independent from each other and that the measurement scale is at least ordinal.  
To derive the test statistic one first combines the two series and then orders all observations by size. 
Then one computes the sum of the ranks (in the combined series) for the two samples. The null 
hypothesis that there is no difference between the two populations will be rejected when the sum of 
the ranks of the two samples is relatively different. If the number of observations in at least one of 
the two samples exceeds 10 (see e.g. Newbold et al., 2003), which is always true in our case, the 
test statistic quickly approaches a normal distribution. The test statistic used for a two-sided test is  
 
12 / ) 1 (







x  , where Wx is the sum of the ranks of the smaller sample, m and n are  
 
the number of observations in the smaller and larger sample, respectively and N=m+n. 
Under the additional assumption that the only difference between the two populations is the mean, 
the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test can be interpreted as a test for equality of means. Even in this 
case it is more powerful than a standard two sample t-test for small samples as it does not require 




 CS  CS+P  CS+RT 
Lags accumulated  @money shock(-1)  @money shock(-1)  @money shock(-1) 
1  0.16       (0.275)  0.14       (0.399)  0.10       (0.496) 
2  0.45*     (0.073)  0.27       (0.326)  0.29       (0.275) 
3  0.97*** (0.002)  0.74**   (0.026)  0.83**   (0.012) 
4  0.88*** (0.008)  0.62 *    (0.078)  0.76**   (0.036) 
5  1.10*** (0.006)  0.78 *    (0.058)  0.93**   (0.037) 
6  1.50*** (0.001)  1.16*** (0.009)  1.36*** (0.005) 
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We checked for robustness of results by running two different types of VARs including the 
following variables in order to derive alternative liquidity shocks.  
 
Alternative 1 
money:     Z = (πcpi, yr, ∆is, m)’ 
credit:       Z   =   ( πcpi, yr, ∆is, pc)’ 
 
Alternative 2 
money:     Z   =   ( πcpi, yr, ∆is, m, rex)’ 
credit:       Z   =   ( πcpi, yr, ∆is, pc, rex)’ 
 
always with X = com, thus including the change in commodity prices as exogenous variable.  
 
The first alternative set of VARs excludes the exchange rate as well as the asset prices (equity and 
residential property) and is thus closer related to a standard money demand based liquidity measure. 
The second alternative set of VARs only excludes the two types of asset prices but also considers 
changes in the exchange rate. The qualitative results using these measures are unchanged. The 
typical result for the cross-section analysis is that the less variables are included in the VAR, the 
more significant and the larger is the coefficient of the money growth shock variable. This suggests 
that some of the correlation between money growth and asset prices is indeed due to the 
endogeneity of money growth and that we are on the conservative side when reporting the long 
VAR including asset prices. 
With respect to the panel boom analysis there is not such a clear pattern for the three types of 
VARs. The money based variables are usually all significant, while in some specifications the 
alternative 1 variable for credit also significantly contributes to explaining the rate of change in real 
housing prices, although not for our preferred specification, the cross-country and real time fixed 





We use quarterly data for 18 OECD countries covering a period that ranges generally from 1970Q1 
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List of countries: 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, the United States and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
List of variables: 
The following table relates the variables used in the paper and the corresponding data sources.  
 
Economic concept  Series and source  Series code 
Broad money  Money supply, broad definition (M3 or 
M2), from OECD Economic Outlook.   
 
Monetary aggregate M3, from ECB, for 
the euro area countries. 
MONEYS 
 
Private credit  Private credit, from the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS, IMF). 
Line 32D 
GDP  GDP, volume, market prices, from OECD 
Economic Outlook. 
 







Private consumption  Private consumption expenditure, volume, 
from OECD Economic Outlook. 
 








Total investment  Gross total fixed capital formation, 
volume, from OECD Economic Outlook. 
 
Investment, gross fixed, total, from the 







Housing investment  Private residential fixed capital formation, 
volume, from OECD Economic Outlook. 
 
Gross fixed capital formation - 
Construction, from INE, for the Spanish 
case. 
Total construction investment, from the 










Unemployment rate  Unemployment rate, from OECD 
Economic Outlook. 
UNR 
CPI inflation  Consumer price, from OECD Economic 
Outlook. 
 
Consumer price, harmonised, from OECD 
Economic Outlook, for the UK. 
 
International Financial Statistics (IFS, 
















Long-term interest rate on government 









Real effective exchange rate, from OECD 
Main Economic Indicators. 
CCRETT01.IXOB 
Government deficit  Government net lending, as a percentage 




The asset price indices have been kindly supplied by Steve Arthur ad Claudio Borio from the BIS 
(See Borio, Kennedy and Prowse (1994) and Borio and Lowe (2001) on these indices). The 
aggregate indices are weighted by the (infrequently updated) shares of the asset components 
(equity, residential property, commercial property) in the respective economy. We used real asset 
price indices as deflated by consumer prices by the BIS. 
 
The credit series displayed huge structural breaks. Whenever the IFS documentation signalled a 
structural break and simultaneously the TRAMO software indicated a level shift (based on the time 
series characteristics), we let TRAMO estimate the size of the break and used the (backward) 
corrected data. 
 
Long and short-term interest rates are backward extended with data coming from the IFS when data 
from the OECD Economic Outlook are not available. Exceptions are the long-term interest rate for 
Spain and Switzerland, which have been backward extended using BIS data. 
 
Money for Denmark has been constructed as follows:  
•  from 1993Q1-2004Q3: OECD-Main Economic Indicators, code MABBMM301.ST 
•  1981Q1-1992Q4: International Financial Statistics (IFS, IMF), line 39m 
•  before 1981: International Financial Statistics (IFS, IMF), line 34 + line 35 
 
Data on public deficits have been interpolated from the corresponding annual series for the 
following countries: Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Italy and Norway. 
 
The recursive trends have been derived by extending the window for the HP filter period by period. 
A starting window with 24 quarters of length is defined for the first (non-recursive) estimates. 
 
Taylor gaps are defined as follows, where i is the nominal interest rate, r the real interest rate, π the 
inflation rate, y real GDP and variables with star denote trend values: 
 
Taylor gap R: it – [rt* + πt+ 0.5(πt- πt*) + 0.5(yt – yt*)], where r*, π* and y* are the recursive HP 
trends derived with λ=1000. 
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